Theoretical literature predicts that asymmetric information in insurance markets generate inefficient outcomes and literature have mostly focus on adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information advantage in insurance market. Adverse selection is the likelihood of those who anticipate more need of health care due to enhanced health risk to purchase health insurance. Therefore, this study investigates adverse selection in health insurance in Nigeria. 
Introduction
Theoretical literature predicts that information advantage in insurance markets produce inefficient outcomes [32; 31; 30] . Adverse selection occurs when individuals buy health insurance due to the anticipated more need of health care as a result of enhanced likelihood of health risk [9] . Literature have also explored potential advantageous selection effects of health insurance [9; 7] . That is, the insured tend to be those with observed (e.g. higher education) and unobserved (e.g. more healthconsciousness) characteristics that correlated with lower health risk. In either case, it means insured individuals are those who have observed and unobserved characteristics that correlated with demand for medical care [9] . Adverse selection generates inefficient outcome in health insurance market as a result of information advantage between buyers and sellers of health insurance.
Expansion of health insurance has become a public policy priority in many developing countries [22] , but adverse selection and moral hazard are key counterbalanced concerns [21] . Though, evidences on adverse selection are limited in developing countries as previous studies mostly focused on developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. The analysis of health care and health insurance system in emerging markets is limited [18] . This problem of lack of evidences in developing countries 1 Nigeria inclusive on insurance induced distortion on demand for health care is also associated with drawbacks due to escalating costs, cream skimming and increasing inequality among the uninsured [14] .
Hence, measures like co-insurance rate and capitation are still used in private and social health insurance in developing countries to reduce consumption at the margin [17] . The above arguments show that most theoretical influences behind the inefficiency created by information advantages in health insurance market are from developed countries [16] where health providers are regulated and held accountable for their actions. Hence, the rationality of the empirical evidences from richer countries in low income countries is contentious, given different structure of health systems, the institutional and regulatory environment within which these two set of countries operate. Therefore, this study investigates the existence of adverse selection in the demand for health insurance in Nigeria.
The effect of asymmetric information on markets operation was first expounded by 2 [1] who argued that an information advantage of the seller over the buyer of a good with non-uniform quality causes bad 1 To the best of researcher's knowledge, Lammers and Warmerdam (2010) is the only study related to adverse selection in health insurance in Nigeria.
quality to chase good quality from the market. Information advantage is a problem central to every insurance context and occur when buyers of health insurance tend to have more idea of their risk status than sellers of health insurance [8] . The first tests of adverse selection estimated a demand function for health insurance in which health status is incorporated as an explanatory variable and high probability of those in poor health to purchase insurance is considered evidence of adverse selection [17] . A number of studies have conducted such analysis using data from rich countries [e.g. 13; 7; 29, 30, 31 etc.) Data from the health and retirement study was used by [3] to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care employing a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care and specified utility function using a standard functional form. The results show that distributions are skewed to the right with a probability mass close to zero, implying that a large number of individuals in insurance category do not suffer large health shocks, but there are individuals with large health shocks in each insurance category which suggests absence of adverse selection. Also, [4] , estimated a dynamic panel data model with Living in Ireland Survey with panel data from 1994 to 2001. Numbers of GP visits, visits to a medical specialist and nights in hospital were used as three measures of health care utilisation. The data contains information on health, socio-economic characteristics, insurance status and medical consumption. Their models allowed for individual specific effects, which captured heterogeneity in preferences and health risk using pooled OLS as a baseline case and general methods of moments (GMM) to estimate dynamic panel data models that include unobserved effects and state dependence. The results show strong evidence for advantageous selection driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences.
Invoices for hospital services from a regional hospital in Croatia was used by [19] to test for adverse selection with three categories of patients: with no supplemental insurance, who bought it and who are entitled to it for free. The identification procedure relies on the premise that the difference in the observed medical care consumption between the patients who bought the insurance and those entitled to free insurance is caused by pure selection effect, whereas the difference in healthcare consumption between the group that received the free insurance and the group that has no insurance is due to moral hazard. The empirical estimation was carried out by the use of matching estimators which compares the outcomes of programme participants with those of matched non-participants where matches are based on the similarity in observed characteristics. The results for all age cohorts combined show that patients with supplemental insurance, purchased or given for free, have more hospital visits and higher total cost which suggest evidence of adverse selection effects.
Few studies tests for adverse selection in health insurance schemes in less-developed countries (LDCs). Willingness to pay for social health insurance was used in Ghana [2] and India [20] to examine adverse selection in health insurance using household data. [2] , found that willingness to pay for social health insurance increases with income as well as in households with high recent health expenditures and difficulties in making payments, (a possible indication of adverse selection). [20] , found that better education and being male increase, the amount people are willing-to-pay. [18] , investigated adverse selection in voluntary micro health insurance in Nigeria. The results suggest that membership of voluntary micro-health insurance was driven by health risk, membership of association and perceived needs of medical care.
Methods

Design and Setting of the Study
Population of the Study and Sampling Design
The data for the study were collected using a purposive sampling survey carried out from September to October 2012 in the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. The six geo-political zones in Nigeria are South-West, South-East, South-South, North-West, North-East and North-Central. One State with a large presence of formal sector workers was chosen from each zone. This choice was based on the fact that the former sector workers are mostly covered by health insurance presently in Nigeria. Lagos State was chosen in the South-West, Imo in the South-East, Rivers in the South-South, Kaduna in the North-West, Adamawa in the North-East and Abuja in the North-Central. The survey for the study was conducted in hospitals, government parastatals, private companies and households. The target population used in the study was the formal sector employees (private or public) and informal sector workers with or without health insurance coverage.
Instrument for Data Collection
The tool for the study is a self-designed 48 items questionnaire containing questions regarding respondent household socio-demographic characteristics, health insurance status, health status, health care expenditures and health care utilisation. A total of 500 questionnaires were administered in each state. The survey for the study was conducted using trained enumerators. Facility used in each chosen state are teaching hospitals, health centres that serve as providers to NHIS in Nigeria and other health centres with health insurance facilities. Government parastatals, private sector establishments and households were also used. The facility used in the South-West 
Administration of the Instrument
The questionnaires were distributed on the basis of ease of access to the respondents; 300 questionnaires were used for facilities, 100 questionnaires for government parastatals and 100 questionnaires for households in each state. The medical officers in each facility and the head of all government and private sector establishments used were approached and their cooperation was solicited. The enumerators through the medical officers administered the questionnaire to those who visited facility and agreed to participate during the survey period. The enumerators administered questionnaires to staffs in government and private establishments. The record officers in the health facilities were entrusted to ensure the questionnaires were properly filled and collect the questionnaires for onward transfer to the enumerators. The enumerators assisted in supervising the households' respondents and double-checked the questionnaires for consistency. Table 1 shows the variables used in the analysis and their definition. Given that the decision to take health insurance is made at time zero before utilization of medical care at time one (assuming illness occurs in time one) and that this depends on initial income, price of health care measured by the co-insurance, health status which cannot be observed by the insurer (and if positively related to health insurance take up indicate presence of adverse selection) and other individual characteristics that may influence the purchase of health insurance. The demand equation for health insurance decision take-up can be represented by Marshallian demand equation. Therefore, given a linear relationship between health insurance take up, income, co-insurance, health status and other factors that influence the decision to purchase health insurance, for measuring the determinants of the demand for health insurance can be written as a linear probability demand model of the form:
Where refers to the individual's insurance status, is the price of health care measured by co-insurance rate multiplied by individual monthly total health expenditure, is the individual's income in period one before the purchase of health insurance, is the individual's health status and are other household or individual's characteristics that can influence the purchase of health insurance such as the level of education, employment status and marital status. Bias in Equation (1) may arise if important unobserved determinants of insurance status such as health status ( ) are correlated with the random error term . For example, those who are less healthy may have a higher than average propensity to seek health insurance and demand for health care. Also, unobservable factors influencing demand for health insurance may positively correlated with the error term ( 1 ). This would mean correlation between insurance status and the error term ( 1 ). Theoretically, we expect the price of medical ( ) care to be negatively related to insurance decision take up. The relationship between insurance take up and initial income depends on the level of individual risk-aversion but since there is no measure of risk aversion, the relationship between health insurance take-up and income was directly estimated. The sign obtained in estimation is an indication of individual risk-aversion. The individual health status is measured using 12 questions concerning general wellbeing of the respondent where a score greater than or equal to the quarter of the total score indicate bad health status. The vector ( ) captures additional individual household characteristics that may be important in the insurance and health care decision, like household size. And ( 1 ) is the error term which captures the individual time-invariant unobserved characteristics. If and are positive coefficient (i.e. if 4 > 0), there is an evidence of adverse selection in health insurance, other things being equal. Equation (1) estimates the determinants of demand for health insurance and adverse selection in health insurance (in which health insurance, social health insurance, and private health insurance were considered). The dependent variable; individual's health insurance status (whether an individual has health insurance or not) is dichotomous (between 0 and 1 and whether individual is covered by social health insurance and private health insurance). Health status ( ) is likely to be endogenous with the health insurance status and other exogenous variable (e.g. household characteristics). Exogeneity test using Wald test was carried out on probit regression. Where the probit regression failed exogeneity test, instrumental variable probit (IVPROBIT) regression was employed. In insurance equation (1), probit model was employed for estimation because the outcome of interest is measured as a binary variable which takes the values of either zero or one. The exogeneity tests using Wald test of exogeneity in probit model indicates that endogeneity problem is valid in health insurance and private health insurance models with probability value of 0.0004 and 0.0001 and absence of endogeneity problem in social health insurance model with probability value of 0.3569. As a result, IVPROBIT technique was employed for the determinants of the demand for health insurance and private health insurance while ordinary probit estimation method with robust standard error was employed for social health insurance.
Results and Discussion
The results in Table 2 revealed a positive coefficient between general health status and the decision to purchase health insurance, social and private health insurance and significant at 1% level. This indicates that irrespective of the type of health insurance, general health status is an important factor in the decision to purchase health insurance. This agreed with the submissions in the literature that insured individuals are those who have observed and unobserved characteristics that are correlated with demand for medical care. Price of health care services is also positively related to health insurance, social health insurance and negatively related to the decision to purchase private health insurance. The positive coefficient between the price of health care, health insurance and social health insurance may be due to the government regulatory role and involvement of government in the payment of the health insurance premium in Nigeria. Insurance income elasticity was also positive for health insurance, social health insurance and negative for private health insurance.
On socio-demographic characteristics, married, the widowed and women are more likely to enroll for health insurance, social and private health insurance. Young individuals are more likely to purchase health insurance and private health insurance while elderly people have high probability of purchasing social health insurance. A female headed household have less probability to purchase health insurance, social and private health insurance than male headed household. Education of the family head is an important determinant of the demand for health insurance with results showing that household with head having post-secondary education are more likely to purchase health insurance, social and private health insurance. Households headed by government worker, transporters, farmers, self-employed persons and unemployed persons are more likely to purchase social health insurance. Further, households in which the spouse of family head involved in trading, farming, self-employed and housewife have less probability of buying private health insurance while households with the spouses of the family head being formal private sector workers have high probability of purchasing social health insurance. A priori general health status and health insurance take up decision are expected to be positively related. The probit and IVPROBIT estimations results of health insurance, different types of health insurance and general health status in Tables III are  re-produced in Table 4 
Conclusion
This study examined the existence of adverse selection in the demand for health insurance, social and private health insurance in Nigeria. General health status was found to be an important determinant of the demand for health insurance, social and private health insurance in Nigeria. This is an evidence of the existence of adverse selection in the demand for health insurance and all types of health insurance in Nigeria. An important policy issue from this is that there is a need for a mechanism of optimal mix of people with poor and good health status. This may require working out different premium for different set of people based on the type and nature of their work. Finally, there may be a need for mechanism to regulate the behaviour of the insured, HMOs' and health insurance provider as health insurance market grows in Nigeria.
